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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONFLICTS AND

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ARTHUR LARSON*

It is a fact familiar to conflict of laws scholars that an unusually
high proportion of landmark conflicts decisions have been supplied
by workmen's compensation cases-such as Bradford Electric Light
Co. v. Clapper,' Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident
Commission,2 Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial-Accident Commission,3 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,4 Industrial
Commission v. McCartin,5 Carroll v. Lanza,' and Crider v. Zurich
Insurance Co. 7 Indeed, one could write a general account of the remarkable metamorphosis of conflicts under constitutional law, from
conceptualism to pragmatism, from full faith and credit to legitimate
state interests, from rigidity to permissiveness, without ever having to
go beyond workmen's compensation cases for illustrative authority
at each key point. Perhaps as effective a way as any to explain this
phenomenon is simply to cite the fact situation in Daniels v. Trailer
Transport Co.' Claimant, a resident of Illinois, executed a contract
of employment inTexas with an employer whose home office was in
Michigan, but who engaged in operations in various states. It was
stipulated that the workmen's compensation law of Michigan should
apply. The employee then worked for the employer in several states,
not including Michigan, Illinois, or Texas, before suffering a compensable accident in Tennessee.
This sort of four-state tangle, which almost sounds as if it had
been invented for an examination question in Conflict of Laws, is by
no means unusual, what with truck, bus and air lines, construction
companies, and many other industries operating on a nationwide or
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1931, LL.D. 1953, Augustana College; M.A. (Juris.) 1938, D.C.L. 1957, Oxford University.
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even worldwide basis, drawing their employees from many states,
contracting with them at the home office or at branch headquarters,
and sending them to work in different states and countries, often after
trying to contrive a private contract that will ensure the applicability
of a single named compensation statute.
If there were substantial uniformity between the different statutes,
the problem would be less acute; but the maximum available benefits
may vary from, for example, a total lermanent disability award limited to $12,500, to a payment of $150 a week for life, the cumulative
value of which in the case of a person totally disabled in his youth
and living to a ripe old age could conceivably exceed $400,000.
Moreover, when the compensation claim is made in one state and a
third party damage action is brought in another, lack of uniformity
on the question of what third persons may be sued9 at common law
by a compensation claimant or subrogee frequently means that the
very existence of the right of action depends on the treatment of the
conflicts problem.
Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co. and the "specialremedy" rule

At the outset it must be stressed that the issue in workmen's
compensation cases is always one of conflict of laws, not choice of
law, when what is at stake is an affirmative claim for benefits, as
distinguished from a related damage suit. This is the necessary result
of the rule that a claim, to be valid, must follow the designated
procedure, that only the special tribunal created by the particular
state can administer claims thereunder, and that rights created by the
compensation act of one state cannot ordinarily be enforced in another state or in a federal court.10
9. LARSON §§ 72, 88.20.

10. Green v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 161 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1947) [It was here held that a
Mississippi federal district court does not have jurisdiction over an action to enforce the Georgia

Workmen's Compensation Act, since the Georgia Act provided for an exclusive administrative
remedy. The court, at 359, said: "[W]here the provision for the liability claimed is coupled with

a provision for a special remedy to be afforded not by a court but by a commission, that remedy
and that alone must be employed and resort to court action may not be had for relief." This
language is almost identical to the language used by the United States Supreme Court in
Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).]; Elliott v. De Soto Crude Oil Purchasing
Corp., 20 F. Supp. 743 (W.D. La. 1937); Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 157
Ark. 528, 249 S.W. 21 (1923); Woodham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 368 (La. App. 1964)
[Claimant was hired and injured in Mississippi by an employer who was licensed to do business
in Louisiana. The court held that only the Mississippi Act could apply, and Louisiana could
not enforce the Mississippi Act, since it was administered by a commission.]; Bethlehem Steel
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Although this general proposition has been largely unquestioned
for many years, the appearance in 1965 of the Supreme Court decision in Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co." has been the occasion for
some reexamination of the rule. Claimant was employed by a Georgia
corporation in Alabama where he resided. He was injured in Alabama
while working under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act. The
Supreme Court held that the Alabama courts could apply the Georgia
Act without violating the full faith and credit clause.
The actual holding of this case is not as broad as might first
appear. Indeed, a close examination of the precise point decided
reveals that the direct effect of the case may be extremely narrow. The
peculiar and limited character of the holding originates in the fact that
the insurance carrier and employer did not defend the case in Alabama. Judgment was taken by default. The claimant then sought to
enforce the judgment in the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama, jurisdiction being based on diversity of citizenship. The court granted carrier's motion to dismiss, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. 12
The issue was thus restricted at the outset by the fact that it was
raised by a collateral attack upon an Alabama judgment. Under
Alabama law, as a result of the rather remarkable holding of
Singleton v. Hope Engineering Co., 13 the rule is that the Alabama
courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the Georgia
Workmen's Compensation Act. There is nothing remarkable in the
Singleton result; what is remarkable is putting the holding on the
Co. v. Payne, 183 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1966) [Claimant allegedly suffered compensable injuries
in North Dakota and Louisiana, and brought suit for compensation benefits under the laws of
these states in Mississippi. The court found that the Louisiana claim was barred by the Louisiana statute of limitations, that the North Dakota system was administrative rather than
judicial, and that therefore Mississippi could not award benefits under the provisions of either
system.]; Davis v. Swift & Co., 175 Tenn. 210, 133 S.W.2d 483 (1939) [The plaintiffs employer
induced the plaintiff to leave Florida, the place of injury, and to return to his home in Tennessee,
promising to continue payments under the Florida Act. When the employer discontinued payment, plaintiff sued in a Tennessee court. It was held that the Tennessee court could grant no
relief, since administration of the Florida Act was entrusted to a commission.]; Greiner v. Alta
Crest Farms, Inc., 115 Vt. 324, 58 A.2d 884 (1948). Contra, Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v.

Warren, 172 Tenn. 403, 112 S.W.2d 837 (1938). See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT

§ 85 (1971): "A state will not exercise judicial jurisdiction if it cannot provide
appropriate relief."
II. 380 U.S. 39 (1965).
12. 324 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1963).
13. 223 Ala. 538, 137 So. 441 (1931).
OF LAWS
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ground of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, in view of the fact that
the injury and the claimant were both located in the jurisdiction.
However, once it is said that the court does not have subject-matter
jurisdiction, it becomes possible under Alabama law to go on and say
that the judgment entered in the absence of such jurisdiction is subject
to collateral attack."4 This is apparently what the federal district court
did in this instance.
The Supreme Court, however, took the view that the district court
and the circuit court of appeals must, erroneously, have reached the
conclusions they adopted on the theory that the full faith and credit
clause required such a result.s' The dissent by Justice Goldberg, with
whom Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart joined, argued strongly that
the lower federal courts had not been impelled by the full faith and
credit clause to reach their conclusions, and in fact, that any reference
to constitutional questions had been conspicuously lacking throughout. If the attack on the judgment in the district court had been based
on the full faith and credit clause, it would immediately have encountered the general rule that a judgment in a state court cannot be
collaterally attacked on full faith and credit grounds."6 Since there was
no reference to this rule, it seems clear that the collateral attack was
possible only because the court, under diversity jurisdiction, was
applying the Alabama rule mentioned above, under which collateral
attack was possible because of the theory that subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist.
The reason, therefore, that the case need not have any wide practical significance is that no insurer or carrier hereafter will presumably
make the mistake of allowing this kind of suit to go by default judgment, in the expectation of later attacking it collaterally in defense
14. See Romero v. Mattioh Constr. Co., 193 Pa. Super. 90, 163 A.2d 671 (1960). The
claimant obtained a compensation judgment against the employer in the New Jersey courts by
statutory service of process upon the Secretary of the New Jersey Compensation Bureau. In an
action in the Pennsylvania court on the judgment, the employer contended that, since he had
done no business in New Jersey, the statutory service of process was void. The court remanded,
holding that the employer may raise the defense of "never accepting the privilege of engaging
in work in New Jersey" to defeat the fundamental grounds on which New Jersey jurisdiction
was originally established.

15. The court based this inference partly on the fact that the Fifth Circuit in its opinion at
324 F.2d 499 (1963), had felt itself bound by Green v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 161 F.2d 359
(5th Cir. 1947), which in turn had taken over almost verbatim the formulation of the doctrine
in Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914) which itself was based on the full faith
and credit clause. See note 10 supra.
16. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947).
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to a suit based on the judgment. Assuming that a direct attack is made
upon an attempt to apply the commission-based compensation law of
State A in the courts of State B, the direct attack would ordinarily
succeed, not because the full faith and credit clause compels this
result, but because it is compelled by considerations of sound judicial
administration.
There is a strong practical reason which is more than adequate to
account for these decisions17 quite apart from any constitutional considerations. In most acts administered by commissions, the substantive rights created by the workmen's compensation act involve more
than a certain number of dollars. The purpose of commission administration is not merely to settle disputes and award sums of money,
but also to maintain supervision over the entire process of seeing that
the claimant receives the full benefits of the act, including medical
care and rehabilitation, with whatever adjustments from time to time
might become necessary. Suppose the workmen's compensation system of State X were of the most highly developed type, complete with
an administrative director, constant supervision of lifetime benefits,
continuous jurisdiction of the commission over the award, rehabilitation and vocational programs, reopening features, and so on. How
could the courts of State Y purport to confer these benefits upon the
claimant? The benefits are inextricably intertwined with the entire
administrative process and cannot be separated from it. This is undoubtedly the practical reason for the holding that commissionadministered compensation acts will not be applied in foreign states.
The Supreme Court's opinion seems to indicate that it did not
consider the matter in this light. If it had, the Court might well have
devoted at least some attention to the problem whether there is a
violation of full faith and credit when State Y purports to apply the
statute of State X under circumstances in which it can do so only in
piecemeal fashion, providing some of the benefits, but without the
entire network of services-for example, supervision, qualifications,
reopening possibilities.Is
17. See cases cited note 10 supra. It should be noted that Green did not involve a holding
by a federal court that one state cannot apply the compensation law of another state. Rather,
it simply held that a federal court, exercising diversity jurisdiction, would not itself choose to
apply the compensation law of the state when that compensation law by its terms was entrusted
to the administration of a commission.
18. Cf Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), afj'g on rehearing,
307 F.2d 131, cert. denied. 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
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In summary, Crider does not detract from the rule that only the
designated tribunal can implement compensation rights. It merely
says that this rule cannot be based upon the full faith and credit
clause. Since, so far as can be ascertained, the rule in workmen's
compensation cases never has been based upon the full faith and credit
clause, and in any event need not be, the net change seems to be
minimal.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals
with instructions to reconsider it free of any possible compulsions
stemming from the full faith and credit clause. The Fifth Circuit
immediately reinstated its order, saying that it was never intended to
be based on any such compulsion; and as to this reinstatement the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, 9 leaving matters largely where they
were before the Court's Crideropinion.
Largely, but not quite entirely. For one thing, Crider,following a
series of Supreme Court decisions abandoning at an accelerating rate
constitutional dictation of answers to compensation conflicts questions, can be viewed as at least pounding one more nail in the coffin
of the early rigid constitutional approach. In addition, Criderstimulated a wave of speculation by commentators as to whether the "special remedy" rule itself, apart from constitutional considerations,
should not perhaps be modified in the interests of fairness and convenience to claimants. 2 To be able to bring his action in his own state of
residence rather than in the foreign state whose act is relied on would
undoubtedly be more convenient in some cases to an injured workman. But-if for the moment we approach the matter on purely
policy grounds-against this occasional convenience must be weighed
the potential loss in divorcing the foreign state's substantive law from
the machinery tailor-made to administer it. The point at which these
commentators go wrong is in underestimating how "special" the
special remedy afforded by a modern compensation act is. If there
were no more to compensation administration than handing the
claimant a sum of money and being done with him, the matter might
be different. But a highly-developed compensation system does far
more than that. It stays with the claimant from the moment of the
19. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 348 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1000
(1966).
20. See particularly: Greenspan, Crider v. Zurich Insurance Company: Decline of Conceptualism in the Conflict of Laws, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 49 (1965); Comment, Forum Commission
Enforcement of Foreign Workmen's Compensation Acts, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 177 (1966).
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accident to the time he is fully restored to normal earning capacity.
This may involve supervising an ongoing rehabilitation program, perhaps changing or extending it, perhaps providing, repairing, and replacing prosthetic devices, and supplying vocational rehabilitation.
Apart from rehabilitation, optimum compensation administration
may require reopening of the award from time to time for change of
condition or for other reasons. If dependency is involved, the widow's
marital status may change, or eligible beneficiaries may be subtracted
making it possible for others to be added. A claimant may come
forward with a plan that will justify converting periodic payments to
a lump sum, subject to the discretionary judgment of a commission
and perhaps of a medical panel that this would serve the best interests
of claimant's rehabilitation.
It is true that, under Pearson v. Northeast Airlines,2 1 it may be
constitutionally permissible to adopt part of the law of another state
without adopting it all. In Pearson the Second Circuit held that New
York could, without offending the full faith and credit clause, apply
the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act to establish a substantive
breach of duty by the airline, and then adopt New York's own measure of damages.
But, although Criderseems to hold that "piecemeal borrowing"
of a foreign compensation statute might not necessarily be unconstitutional, such borrowing remains a violation of sound judicial administration and, in some instances, as when a state with primitive compensation administrative facilities purports to borrow piecemeal from
a state with advanced and elaborate facilities, it is a flagrant breach
of the principle that a substantive remedy intertwined with a specifically designed administrative system cannot be adequately afforded
by a foreign court.
It is sometimes held that, if the compensation rights are not tied
to any particular administrative procedure, but are enforceable generally by the courts of the home state, there is no such obstacle to their
being enforced in the courts of another state, 22 but the opposite hold21. 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
22. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, 15 F.2d 171 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 742 (1926);
Lindberg v. Southern Cas. Co., 15 F.2d 54 (S.D. Tex. 1926), affd sub nom. United Dredging
Co. v. Lindberg, 18 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 759 (1927); Floyd v. Vicksburg
Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395 (1930).
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ing is equally common.? The essence of the question is not so much
whether the administration of the act in the two states is by court or
commission as whether the forum state can provide substantially all
of the remedy guaranteed by the foreign statute. For example, the
Mississippi Supreme Court said, in granting relief under the Louisiana Act: "It is not necessary that the remedy shall be identical with
that of the foreign jurisdiction. . . . It is only necessary . . . that we
are able to do substantial justice between the parties under the rights
existing by virtue of the foreign substantive law." 12 4 But the potential
injustice may take many forms, even when the comparison is between
two court-administered laws. An obvious illustration is the unavailability of a comparable reopening procedure in the forum state. In
z the court
Johnson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation,2
said that the test was whether "the law by which the right claimed
must be determined is such that we can properly and intelligently
administer it."' 21 The Texas court was being asked to apply the Louisiana court-administered act. The Louisiana statute permitted reopening to increase or diminish the award on a showing of change in
condition. Since the Texas court had no such authority under Texas
law, application of the Louisiana statute was refused.
By the same token, it does not follow that, because the laws of
the forum state and foreign state are both commission-administered,
the obstacle to statute-borrowing is surmounted. There may still be
many important and valuable rights that the forum state could not
provide, even if it could somehow assume administration of the claim
through its commission. One commentator, recognizing the legal
impediments to a direct filing of a claim with the commission of the
forum state for statutory benefits provided by a foreign statute, has
suggested that the claimant might first apply to the courts of the
forum state, which in turn would delegate the handling of the claim
to the compensation commission of the forum state. 27 Without going
23. Martin v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 252 F. 207 (W.D. Wash. 1918); Mosely v. Empire
Gas & Fuel Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S.W. 762 (1926); Consolidated Underwriters v. King, 160
Tex. 18, 325 S.W.2d 127, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 198 (1959) (holding that although both the

Texas and Louisiana acts are court-administered, Texas will not enforce rights created under
the Louisiana act).
24. Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 567, 579-80, 126 So. 395, 398 (1930).
25. 99 S.W.2d 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
26. Id. at 981. See the more recent case of Consolidated Underwriters v. King, 160 Tex.
18, 325 S.W.2d 127, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 198 (1959), which also involved a refusal of Texas
to apply the Louisiana law.
27. Comment, Forum Commission Enforcement of Foreign Workmen's Compensation
Acts, supra note 20.
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into the formidable task of ascertaining on a state-by-state basis how
this could be legally accomplished, one may only observe that the
device, even if available, would not in a significant proportion of cases
solve the basic difficulty, which is the disparity between the remedies
that can be afforded even as between commission-administered systems.
The discussion of any serious inroads into the "special remedy"
rule proves to be rather academic when set against the realities of
compensation practice. If exceptions are to be made to the rule, they
would almost certainly have to be on a case-by-case basis. The court
would in every instance have to undertake a definitive analysis of the
compensation systems of the two states, analyze their similarities and
differences, try to weigh the importance of the differences, perhaps try
to guess which differences would be significant in the particular
case-and then in turn weigh these differences against the value of
allowing claimant the convenience of proceeding in his own state. It
seems most unlikely that courts will be willing to shoulder this task
merely in order to let the claimant bring his claim closer to home.
And as for delegating the case to the -local commission, is a claimant
going to take on himself the staggering task of achieving not one but
two or three ground-breaking innovations in compensation law and
procedure, with all the appellate litigation this would entail, when he
could get a routine award without litigation by following orthodox
procedures?
The statutes of Arizona,2 Vermont, 29 and Hawaii 30 expressly permit rights created under the acts of other states to be enforced by their
courts or commissions, but no decisional law has grown up showing
how this can be done if the filing of a claim with a specified tribunal
in the other state is a condition precedent to recovery. Indeed, Vermont refused to use this express statutory power when asked to apply
the compensation law of Massachusetts, saying that "the remedy is
an integral part of the right given and the latter has no existence
separate and apart from the former. 31 Idaho had such a statute32 but
repealed it in 1963, and substituted a statute empowering the governor
to enter into reciprocal arrangements with other states.3 3 If anything
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-904(B) (1956).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 620 (1967).
HAWAH REV. LAWS § 386-6 (1968).
Grenier v. Alta Crest Farms, Inc., 115 Vt. 324, 58 A.2d 884 (1948).
Ch.81, § 62, [1917] Idaho Sess. Laws 252.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-619 (Supp. 1969).

1046

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1971:1037

is to be done to change the handling of this problem, the Idaho
approach of authorizing ad hoc mutual arrangements may well be the
most promising, since in any such plan the satisfactory meshing and
balancing of rights under the two state systems could be thought out
and worked out in advance.
Successive A wards in Different States
The development of the central conflicts problem is here divided
into two steps: first, a demonstration that more than one statute can
constitutionally apply to the same injury, and more than one award
can be made so long as deduction is made for a prior award-the
purpose of this demonstration being to show that the essence of the
compensation conflicts question is not whether State A or B has the
right, to the exclusion of the other, to apply its statute, but whether
any given state has a sufficient interest in the case to justify applying
its statute; and second, an examination of the question, "when can a
state constitutionally apply its statute to a particular work injury?"
with the conclusion that any state having a legitimate social interest
in the injury and its effects on the workman, the employer, or the
community can apply its statute without violating its obligation to
give full faith and credit to the statutes of other states also having an
34
interest.
An appraisal of the present rule on successive awards in different
states must take the form of an analysis of two Supreme Court decisions, Industrial Commission v. McCartin35 and Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt.3 1 It is now generally accepted that McCartin, in practical
effect, has recognized the principle of successive awards and thereby
discredited Magnolia, which had held on its facts that a prior Texas
award was a constitutional bar to an award in Louisiana of the
amount by which the Louisiana benefits exceeded those allowed by
Texas.
Since, however, McCartin did not expressly overrule Magnolia, it
is necessary to scrutinize the two opinions with some care, to see
34. Since this article is concerned only with constitutional issues, it does not reach the third
question, which would be: "to what extent have the states in fact applied their statutes to
extraterritorial injuries, within the permissible constitutional limits?" For a detailed state-bystate treatment of this question, showing the relative importance of such factors as place of
contracting, place of injury and place of employment relation in the statutes and decisions of
the different states, see LARSON § 87.
35. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
36. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
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whether McCartin has indeed established a successive-award principle
of general applicability.
Prior to McCartin, state courts, with virtual unanimity, had held
or assumed that a prior award under the laws of another state was
no bar to an award under local law made in accordance with the local
law's own standards of applicability.3 7 There was always, of course,
the understanding that the claimant could not have a complete double
recovery but must deduct from his present recovery the amount of the
prior award.
Then, in 1943, an oil field laborer, whose supplementary award in
Louisiana, after a Texas award, had been sustained by the Louisiana
appellate courts, appeared pro se to defend the Louisiana award
against constitutional attack in the Supreme Court. His failure gave
us Magnolia, a five-to-four decision with two dissenting opinions. The
rationale of the holding was that "in Texas, a compensation award
• . . is explicitly made by statute in lieu of any other recovery" for
the same injury; the award therefore became res judicata and was
entitled to full faith and credit in other jurisdictions like any judgment. The case evoked widespread controversy, with many writers
deploring the new turn of events and favoring the dissenting views.3 8
Four years later, McCartin, in which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, on the strength of the Magnolia doctrine, had denied a supplementary recovery in Wisconsin 9 after an Illinois award, reached the
Supreme Court. Here an Illinois resident had made a contract of
employment with an Illinois employer in Illinois, pursuant to which
he did some work in Wisconsin, in the course of which he was injured.
He began compensation proceedings in both states. While the Wis37. Migues' Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N.E. 847 (1933); McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217,
174 N.E. 338 (1931); Sweet v. Austin Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 381, 171 A. 684 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
Hughey v. Ware, 34 N.M. 29, 276 P. 27 (1929); Bach v. Hampden Sales Ass'n, 293 N.Y. 847,
59 N.E.2d 439 (1944); Gilbert v. Des Lauriers Column Mould Co., 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N.Y.
Supp. 274 (1917); Price v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 201 S.C. 484, 23 S.E.2d 744 (1942);
Salvation Army v. Industrial Comm'n, 219 Wis. 343, 263 N.W. 349 (1935); Interstate Power
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 466, 234 N.W. 889 (1931); accord, RESTATEMENT OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 403 (1934), as worded prior to the 1947 amendment. See note 42 infra.
38. Cheatham, Res Judicataand the Full Faithand Credit Clause:Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Hunt, 44 COLUMI. L. REV. 330 (1944); Freund, ChiefJustice Stone and the Conflict of Laws,
59 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1946); Wolkin, Workmen's Compensation Award-Commonplace or
Anomaly in Full Faith and Credit Pattern?,92 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (1944); 48 DICK. L. REV.
194 (1944); 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1944); 19 IND. L.J. 268 (1944); 17 S. CAL. L. REV.
315 (1944); 18 TUL. L. REV. 509 (1944).
39. McCartin v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522 (1946), rev'd, 330 U.S.
622 (1947).
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consin proceedings were pending, the Illinois commission issued a
formal order approving a settlement agreement under Illinois law,
and full payment was made under the order. The settlement contract,
however, contained this sentence: "This settlement does not affect any
rights that applicant may have under the Workmen's Compensation
Act of the State of Wisconsin."
The Supreme Court, this time by unanimous vote, reinstated the
Wisconsin award, distinguishing Magnolia. The primary ground of
distinction was not, however, the express reservation of Wisconsin
rights, but the absence in the Illinois statute or case law of an explicit
prohibition against seeking additional or alternative relief under.the
laws of another state. Since the vast majority of compensation laws
resemble the Illinois law in this respect, the decision has been taken
to mean that for all practical purposes successive awards are now
sanctioned." An amendment to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,

designed to bring it into harmony with these decisions, 4 adopted this
interpretation by using the following language:
Award already had under the Workmen's Compensation Act of another
state will not bar a proceeding under an applicable Act, unless the Act where
the award was made was designed to preclude the recovery of an award under
any other Act, but the amount paid on a prior award in another state will be
2
credited on the second award.1

The crucial paragraph of the McCartin opinion, setting forth the
reason for its conclusion-before anything is said about the express
reservation in the contract-is sufficiently important to warrant quotation in full. The Court first quotes the Illinois exclusive-coverage
clause and shows that it means in Illinois, as it does in practically
every other state, that it is exclusive only in the sense that no other
common law or statutory remedy under local law can be sought. The
Court then goes on to say:
But there is nothing in the statute or in the decisions thereunder to indicate
40. Law review writers have almost unanimously interpreted the case as in effect overruling
Magnolia for purposes of most state statutes. E.g., Price, State JurisdictionStrikes Back, 19
N.Y.S.B.A. BULL. 199 (1947); 33 CORNELL L.Q. 310 (1947); 60 HARv. L. REV. 993 (1947); cf
47 COLUtM. L. REV. 846 (1947).
41. H. GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 289 (3d ed. 1949).
42. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 403 (Supp. 1943). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971), streamlines the statement of the rule to the following concise
version:
§ 182. Effect of Two Statutes Governing Injury
Relief may be awarded under the workmen's compensation statute of a State of the
United States, although the statute of a sister State also is applicable.
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that it is completely exclusive, that it is designed to preclude any recovery by
proceedings brought in another state for injuries received there in the course
of an Illinois employment. And in light of the rule that workmen's compensation laws are to be liberally construed in furtherance of the purpose for which
they were enacted, we should not readily interpret such a statute so as to cut
off an employee's right to sue under other legislation passed for his benefit.
Only some unmistakable language by a state legislature or judiciary would
warrant our accepting such a construction. Especially is this true where the
rights affected are those arising under legislation, of another state and where
the full faith and credit provision of the United States Constitution is brought
into play.
We need not rest our decision, however, solely upon the absence of any
provision or construction of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act forbidding an employee from seeking alternative or additional relief under the laws
of another state. .... 43

At this point the Court discusses the express reservation of rights

in Wisconsin, and concludes with these significant words: "the reservation spells out what we believe to be implicit in that Act-namely,
that an Illinois workmen's compensation award of the type here involved does not foreclose an additional award under the laws of
44

another state."
Thus, the Court comes back to its basic and original ground, the
nature of the statute itself, and says that the express reservation does

no more than make abundantly clear what the act, of itself, must in
any case be construed to mean.
The decisive question therefore becomes: Does the statute of a
given state, as construed by "unmistakable language," forbid relief
under the laws of another state? One thing is clear. The normal exclusive-coverage clause does not have this effect, as the McCartin

opinion itself recognizes.4 5 It is therefore important to observe, in

43. 330 U.S. at 627-28 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 630 (italics supplied). A more careful reading of the opinion at this point would
have prevented the blunder in Bolton v. O'Connor, 114 F. Supp. 273 (S.D. Miss. 1953). The
injury had occurred in Mississippi while the contract and residence location was Louisiana.
Award was made in Mississippi, and later another award was sought in the U.S. District Court
of Mississippi under Louisiana law. The court held the Magnolia rule applicable and distinguished McCartin on the sole ground that it was based on the stipulation between the parties.
45. Curiously, this elementary point was missed in Gasch v. Britton, 202 F.2d 356 (D.C.
Cir. 1953). The court denied an award in the District after an award had been made in Maryland, on reasoning similar to that in Magnolia.The decision was based on the exclusive coverage
provision relating to suit against the employer, that compensation shall be in lieu of "any and
all rights of action whatsoever against any person whomsoever." The court made much of broad
exclusiveness language from Victory Sparkler & Specialty Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 128
A. 635 (Md. App. 1925), which however, was nothing more than a garden-variety holding that
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estimating the impact of McCartin on Magnolia, that the general
exclusive coverage clause of Thxas was not significantly different from

that of Illinois. Texas did, however, have an express statutory provision, existing in very few other states,4" that if an employee first
obtains compensation in another state for an out-of-state injury, he
shall not thereafter get an award in Texas. This is not the present
situation, but its reverse. The statute does not go on to say what the

Magnolia opinion reads into it, that if the employee first obtains
compensation in Texas he shall not thereafter get compensation outside of the state. The McCartin opinion seems to hold that this latter

kind of prohibition must now appear in the statute or case law of a
particular state if the Magnolia doctrine is to apply. On this interpretation of the McCartin rule, the Magnolia doctrine will apparently
not apply even in Texas, once its statute and decisions are realistically

construed. For it cannot be honestly said that anything in the Texas
statutes or cases indicates that, when the sequence of events takes the

form of a first award in Texas and a supplementary award in another
state to bring the amount up to the standards of the latter, the State

of Texas has any unconquerable aversion to the second award. All
Texas says is that if some other state has first awarded compensation,

it will add nothing to it in a later proceeding brought in Texas.
the compensation remedy is exclusive of common-law actions, and contained no language,
unmistakable or other, on compensation awards in sister states. Here the employee lived in
Maryland and was injured there, but the place of employment contract was in the District of
Columbia.
46. See also Nevada Indus. Comm'n v. Underwood, 79 Nev. 496, 387 P.2d 663 (1963).
Nevada law, NEv. REv. STAT. § 616.530(I) (1963), provides that "any action or proceeding in
any other state to recover any damages or compensation . . . shall constitute an irrevocable
waiver of any and all compensation" under the .Nevada laws. In Underwood the employee was
hired in Idaho, was regularly employed in Nevada, but was killed in an accident in Utah. The
widow filed a claim on which benefits were voluntarily paid under the Idaho compensation laws.
The claim and payment were held to effect the irrevocable waiver, although the widow and the
carrier had expressly agreed that the widow reserved her rights to claim death benefits under
the Nevada law. Court dicta indicated that the quoted Nevada provision, referring to "action"
and "damages," applied to common-law actions while "proceeding" and "compensation"
applied to compensation claim proceedings, but an unsuccessful action or proceeding would not
bar a subsequent claim under the Nevada law.
Arizona and Oregon provide that their own laws shall not apply to out-of-state injuries if
the law of the state of injury applies. But this is quite a different matter, since it delimits local
coverage generally and leaves nothing to the claimant's election. Similar in this respect is the
Massachusetts provision, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 26 (1965), that if an employee has
elected, under a foreign act permitting such election, to remain under common-law rules generally, he shall not be covered by compensation in Massachusetts. This too is not an election, for
the purpose of a particular injury, between coexisting rights, but a definition in advance of the
basic scope of the local statute.
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The above analysis of the McCartin decision's effect has been
confirmed, not only by the Restatement and almost all writers, but
also by the great majority of subsequent cases.4 7 Cook v. Minneapolis
47. Agee v. Industrial Comm'n, 10 Ariz. App. 1,455 P.2d 288 (1969) [Claimants, residents
of Colorado who were hired in Colorado, were injured while on a trucking run in Arizona on
their way to California, received lump sum settlements in Colorado, then sought recovery in
Arizona and were entitled to the additional benefits provided by Arizona law.]; Lavoie's Case,
334 Mass. 403, 135 N.E.2d 750, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956) [Rhode Island resident who
made employment contract there and had received benefits under its act for an injury in Massachusetts held entitled to recovery under Massachusetts Act]; Schenkel v. Tower Builders Co.,
380 Mich. 492, 157 N.W.2d 204 (1968) [Claimant, an Indiana resident, was employed by an
Indiana corporation. While performing some work in Michigan he suffered disabling injuries.
Compensation was applied for and recovered in Indiana, whose compensation act had been
construed to be exclusive. Claimant then applied for and received additional benefits in Michigan, with credit being given for weekly payments made under the Indiana act. The court held
that the acceptance of benefits under the Indiana act did not deprive Michigan of jurisdiction
to award additional benefits under its act, and the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution did not bar the receipt of benefits under the act of one state after an award
had been made in another state whose statute had been construed so as to be exclusive in
application.]; Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Constr. Co., 231 Minn. 433, 43 N.W.2d 792 (1950)
(accord, Sorenson v. Standard Constr. Co., 238 Minn. 68, 55 N.W.2d 630 (1952)); Martin v.
L & A Contracting Co., 249 Miss. 441, 162 So. 2d 870 (1964) [Claimant was hired and regularly
employed in Mississippi, but was injured in Florida. He was permitted to receive benefits under
both the Florida and Mississippi compensation acts, deducting the amount of the first award
from the second.]; Harrison Co. v. Norton, 244 Miss. 752, 146 So. 2d 327 (1962) [The claimant
was employed under a contract made in Georgia to work in Mississippi, his residence and the
place of injury. The carrier voluntarily made payments under the Georgia act and the claimant
signed a Georgia form for "Final Compensation Settlement Receipt." He later brought a claim
for permanent partial disability under the Mississippi act. The court reasoned that since the
Mississippi act states that "No agreement by an employee to waive his right to compensation
under this act shall be valid" (Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-21 (1942) (Rec., § 15)), the "Final
Receipt" of Georgia benefits did not bar a claim for Mississippi benefits. The court limited its
decision to permitting a subsequent award, with credit for previous benefits paid, where the first
award was granted under those state acts, such as Georgia, which do not specifically make an
award in such state exclusive.]; Cramer v. State Concrete Corp., 39 N.J. 507, 189 A.2d 213
(1963) [An award under the New York act does not bar the claimant's right to claim benefits
under the New Jersey act.]; Bowers v. American Bridge Co., 43 N.J. Super. 48, 127 A.2d 580,
affd, 24 N.J. 390, 132 A.2d 28 (1956) [New Jersey awarded benefits even though claimant had
received payment in Pennsylvania, the place of injury, because the Pennsylvania act does not
expressly exclude the right of recovery by an injured workman under the laws of any other
state.]; Hudson v. Kingston Contracting Co., 58 N.J. Super. 455, 156 A.2d 491 (Mercer County
Ct. 1959) [The deceased employee was a resident of Pennsylvania, the employer was domiciled
in New Jersey, the place of contract was New Jersey, and the fatal accident occurred in Maryland. The widow was awarded S 10,300 under the Maryland compensation act but would receive
$36,855.02 under the New Jersey act. The court followed the McCartin case, holding that the
Maryland act was exclusive only as to rights arising in Maryland. The difference in the awards
was found to be so great as to be obnoxious to the policy of the New Jersey act, justifying the
denial of full faith and credit. New Jersey benefits were awarded less the amount paid under
the Maryland award. The court specifically followed the dissenting opinion in Gasch v. Britton,
202 F.2d 356, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (Fahy, J., dissenting).]. Contra, Gasch v. Britton, 202 F.2d
356 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Bolton v. O'Connor, 114 F. Supp. 273 (S.D. Miss. 1953).
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Bridge Construction Co.48 is typical. Here, the employer's business,
the employee's residence, and the place of contracting were in Minnesota, while the place of injury was in North Dakota. Benefits were
first received under a North Dakota award. The exclusive-remedy
clause of the North Dakota statute was admittedly even stronger than
that of Illinois, for it provided that injured employees "shall have
recourse . . . only to the fund and not to the employer" and in
another section that "the payment of compensation . . . shall be in
lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever." But since the statute
did not explicitly preclude proceedings in another state, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the McCartin rule permitted a supplementary award in Minnesota.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, confronted with a similar set of
facts, laid its stress on the question of finality of the first award.4" A
prior award had been made in Montana for temporary total disability, and payments were still running at the time of the Wisconsin
award. The Wisconsin court observed that the Montana board had
continuing jurisdiction over the award, and could later determine any
permanent disability that might exist. The first award was therefore
not "final," and, under the Magnolia and McCartin opinions, not
binding on other states. Whether the Magnolia decision meant final
in this sense or final in the sense that the exact points covered by the
particular award, being unappealed, 0 could not be reopened, may be
debatable; but this case in any event is one more illustration of the
tendency toward constriction of the Magnolia rule.
Several variants of the successive-award problem may be mentioned in which the facts are much stronger than in McCartin and,
in which, afortiori,the first proceedings have been held not to prejudice the second. Several cases, both before and after McCartin,
48. 231 Minn. 433, 43 N.W.2d 792 (1950).
49. Spietz v. Industrial Comm'n, 251 Wis. 168, 28 N.W.2d 354 (1947). See also Plater v.
Kane Warehouse Co., 241 Md. 462, 217 A.2d 102 (1966). Claimant regularly worked in Washington and Virginia, but was injured in Maryland. An award was made under the Maryland
act, but claimant also Filed under the Washington act, which provided greater benefits. Claimant
was permitted to withdraw the Maryland claim, and proceed under the Washington act.
50. Chapman v. John St. John Drilling Co., 73 N.M. 261, 387 P.2d 462 (1963). The
employee was awarded compensation in Texas, but appealed the award. He then filed a claim
under the New Mexico act. The New Mexico Supreme Court avoided an application of the
Magnolia doctrine by noting that, under Texas law, a case pending appeal is not res judicata,
and therefore full faith and credit need not be given in New Mexico. Dismissal of the claim
under the New Mexico act was reversed and remanded for hearing and determination.
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have held that a prior voluntary payment of compensation accepted
by the employee under the laws of one state does not detract from the
employee's statutory right to an award in another state, whether the
agreement for compensation had received commission approval or
not. 51 Similarly, when the employee has not applied for compensation,
but an award has been entered at the ex parte request of the employer,
even Texas, with its express statute forbidding an award to one who
has "elected to pursue his remedy" in another state, permits a supple52
mentary award.
51. Industrial Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 80 Cal. App. 2d 480, 182 P.2d 309
(1947); Industrial Track Builders of Am. v. LeMaster, 429 S.W.2d 403 (Ky. App. 1968)
[Claimant received benefits under Indiana law, and then filed a claim in Kentucky. Shortly after
injury claimant signed an agreement with the carrier to receive benefits under the Indiana act,
but took no further action, other than to receive benefits. The court held that since there was
no express intention in the Indiana statute to have its law be exclusive, claimant was allowed to
file a subsequent claim in Kentucky. However, the court indicated that in other circumstances,
such as if claimant had knowingly filed a claim in Indiana and prosecuted it to a final award,
he might not be entitled to later claim benefits in Kentucky.]; Cline v. Byrne Doors, Inc., 324
Mich. 540, 37 N.W.2d 630 (1949); Adams v. Emery Transp. Co., 15 Mich. App. 593, 167
N.W.2d 110 (1969) [Claimant worked for two trucking companies, which eventually merged.
He was injured prior to the merger, and filed two compensation claims, one against one of the
firms in Illinois, and the other in Michigan, against both firms. The Illinois claim was settled,
including an agreement that Illinois had exclusive jurisdiction, and that claimant would dismiss
the Michigan proceedings. However, he did not do so, and eventually was awarded compensation against the employer who had not been involved in the Illinois claim. On appeal, the court
held that although it was not satisfied with the result, the Illinois settlement would not bar
further proceedings in Michigan, and the Michigan employer could not take credit for any
amount paid pursuant to the Illinois decree, which involved a different employer.]; Miller v.
National Chair Co., 19 N.J. Misc. 275, 18 A.2d 847 (Workmen's Comp. Bureau), affd, 127
N.J.L. 414, 22 A.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1941), affd per curiam, 129 N.J.L. 98, 28 A.2d 125 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1942); Della Vecchia v. World Scope Pub. Co., 64 N.J. Super. 33, 165 A.2d 872
(Essex County Ct. 1960) [The claimant was awarded New York compensation without appearance before the board, or service of process. He cashed the checks. The court held that his
actions did not bar a claim under the more generous provisions of the New Jersey compensation
act.]; Franklin v. George P. Livermore, Inc., 58 N.M. 349, 270 P.2d 983 (1954) (employment
contract in New Mexico, injury in Texas; voluntary payments under Texas law not a waiver of
any rights under New Mexico law). See also Reed v. Fish Eng'r Corp., 74 N.M. 45, 390 P.2d
283 (1964) [Payment of Utah benefits may toll the statute of limitations on filing a later claim
for New Mexico benefits. Case remanded.]; cf. Pate v. Makin Drilling Co., 66 N.M. 402, 239
P.2d 121 (1960) [The employee of a New Mexico firm was sent from New Mexico to an oil
field in Texas, where he was injured. Compensation was paid under the Texas compensation
act until the benefits expired. The employee then filed claim for benefits under the New Mexico
act. A lower court order requiring the employer to pay medical benefits was reversed. The court
stated that the order would have been tantamount to a finding that the employer was also liable
under the New Mexico act before such liability had been determined.].
52. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Skidmore, 222 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). See Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Miller, 370 S.W.2d 12 (rex. Civ. App. 1963). The Texas insurance
carrier had the employee sign an "election of benefits" statement upon receipt of voluntarily
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Moreover, a denial of compensation in the first state does not

necessitate a denial in the second state. 3 Thus, when the employment

contract was in Missouri and the injury in Arkansas, a denial of

compensation in Arkansas, on the ground that claimant was an independent contractor, was held not to require a denial in Missouri, since
each state may have its own interpretation of employee status."

On the policy question whether the availability of the supplementary-award procedure is a desirable thing there is some difference of

opinion. The argument against supplementary awards is that it may
subject the employer and insurance carrier to repeated claims in dif-

ferent jurisdictions, protracting litigation and making it impossible
for the employer and carrier to know with assurance when a claim
has been fully satisfied. On the other side it is urged that employees

typically are at a disadvantage in learning of their potential rights
under various statutes of other states, especially since complex conflict-of-laws issues may sometimes be involved; hence they may quite
forgivably make an unfortunate choice at the time of filing the first

claim.5 5 It has even been suggested that representatives of the em-

ployer and insurer might influence the claimant toward such a

choice. 6 In any case, the worst that can happen to the defendants,

apart from the inconvenience mentioned above, is that they will have
to pay no more than the highest compensation allowed by any single
paid Louisiana benefits. The court held that since he did not read the statement, and, having
only a fourth grade education, did not understand what he was signing, the equitable rule
abhorring elections would support a finding that no election had been made. Texas benefits
award, supplemental to the Louisiana benefits, affirmed.
53. Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 119 Me. 552, 112 A. 516 (1921); Loudenslager v.
Gorum, 355 Mo. 181, 195 S.W.2d 498, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 816 (1946); La Rue v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 57 N.M. 93, 254 P.2d 1059 (1953) [Denial of award by Arizona, on the ground
that the injury did not arise in the course of employment, was not a bar at a subsequent suit in
New Mexico. Claimant was injured in Arizona, and resided there, but was employed in New
Mexico and had been working there. This is significant since New Mexico will not allow a
double recovery there for the same accident because it is contrary to public policy. Hughey v.
Ware, 34 N.M. 29, 276 P. 27 (1929). Court stated that since claimant here had not received an
award in Arizona this decision does not conflict with the Hughey case.]; Yoshi Ogino v. Black,
278 App. Div. 146, 104 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1951); Le Flore County Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sickmann,
348 P.2d 312 (Okla. 1959) [Since the contract of hire was consummated in Oklahoma, a denial
in Arkansas did not preclude an award in Oklahoma.].
54. Loudenslager v. Gorum, 335 Mo. 181, 195 S.W.2d 498, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 816
(1946).
55. Cheatham, supra note 38, at 345.
56. H. HoRowITz, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 39 (1944). See, e.g., Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Miller, 370 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
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states7 having an applicable statute-which is the same amount that
would always be payable if the claimant made the best-informed
choice the first time.
ConstitutionalLimits on Applicability of State Compensation Acts
There are six grounds on which the applicability of a particular
compensation act has been asserted. They are that the local state is
the: Place where the injury occurred; Place of making the contract;
Place where the employment relation exists or is carried out; Place
where the industry is localized; Place where the employee resides; or
Place whose statute the parties expressly adopted by contract.
When one of these falls within the local state, and some or all of
the others occur in another state, the question arises whether the local
state can apply its statute without being accused of denying full faith
and credit to the statute of the other state. As matters now stand, it
is clear that the state which was the locus of any one of the first three
items-contract, injury or employment-and probably also of the
next two-employee residence and business localization-can constitutionally apply its statute if it desires.5
Until 1932, no one worried much about constitutional inhibitions
on the applicability of compensation acts. Each state went ahead
implementing its own theories on what features brought a given injury
within its statute, with considerable diversity in the results. The contract, tort and employment theories all had their adherents; occa57. As to the possibility of double recovery in certain rare fact combinations, see LARSON
§ 85.70.
58. TnE RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 42, adopts substantially the above analysis:
§ 181. Permissible Range of Territorial Application.
A State of the United States may consistently with the requirements of due process
award relief to a person under its workmen's compensation statute, if
(a) the person is injured in the State, or
(b) the employment is principally located in the State, or
(c) the employer supervised the employee's activities from a place of business in the
State, or

(d) the State is that of most significant relationship to the contract of employment
with respect to the issue of workmen's compensation under the rules of §§ 187-188 and
196, or
(e) the parties have agreed in the contract of employment or otherwise that their rights
should be determined under the workmen's compensation act of the State, or
(1) the State has some other reasonable relation to the occurrence, the parties and
the employment.
The Reporter's Note states: "The rule of Subdivisions (a) to (f) is supported by 2
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 368-375 (1952)."
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sional unique combinations or theories appeared in other states; and
some states did not even bother to explain what theory they were
using.
The constitutional issue was injected by the 1932 Supreme Court
decision in Bradford Electric Light Company v. Clapper.5" In this
case all the incidents of the employment except the place of injury
were within Vermont-making of the contract, principal place of
employment, employee's residence, dependents' residence, and location of the employer's business. The decedent was killed while on
temporary duty in New Hampshire. New Hampshire's law had the
unique feature of allowing the claimant, after the injury or death, to
elect either compensation or common-law remedies. The decedent's
administratrix, before any proceedings were brought in Vermont,
undertook a common-law action against the employer in New Hampshire. The defense was the provision of the Vermont act forbidding
common-law suits when the injury fell within the terms of the Vermont compensation act.
The Supreme Court, reversing the district and circuit courts, held
the New Hampshire action barred, since the full faith and credit
clause applies to statutes of sister states as well as to judgments. The
Court stressed that the interest of New Hampshire was only "casual," and concluded its opinion with this significant reservation:
We have no occasion to consider whether if the injured employee had been a
resident of New Hampshire, or had been continuously employed there, or had
left dependents there, recovery might validly have been permitted under New
Hampshire law.1°

It should also be kept in mind, as this case is compared with later
developments in the same area, that the thing barred was not conferral
of affirmative compensation benefits in New Hampshire but escape
from the compensation system into the common-law system by the
choice of the New Hampshire statute.
As the law stood under Bradford, then, it was generally assumed
that the single factor, locus of injury, was not enough to permit
assertion of coverage by a state, at least when the employee's presence
in the state was only incidental and temporary.
Three years later, Alaska Packers Association v. IndustrialA cci59. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
60. Id. at 163.
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1
began to develop the general test which inquires
dent Commission"
whether any incidents of the injury that are important and relevant
to workmen's compensation fall within the local state. The injury in
this case occurred in Alaska, but not, this time, on a temporary or
incidental mission; the work was entirely to be performed within
Alaska. But the contract was made in California,62 which was the base
of operations, transportation to and from Alaska was provided, and
the employee was expected to return to California on completion of
the work. The parties had agreed that the Alaska act should apply.
The Supreme Court held that California's interest in the injury was
sufficient to justify application of its own statute. Of special significance is the Court's observation that the claimant, if not compensated
in California, might well become a public charge there, since he probably could not go back to Alaska at his own expense to seek compensation under Alaska's act. In other words, a major purpose of compensation legislation is to prevent the throwing of such injured workmen on local charity, and therefore California had a highly relevant
interest in forestalling that event by utilizing its own compensation
law.
Any impression that locus of injury was alone insufficient to support coverage was dispelled in 1939 by Pacific Employers Insurance
Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission.13 The relative sharing of the

61. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). The significanoe of this case went far beyond the field of workmen's compensation. It marked the beginning of the end of rigid conceptualism in conflict of laws generally, and introduced the new
approach based on legitimate state interests. Professor Brainerd Currie stressed this, stating:
In 1935, in Alaska Packers Association v. IndustrialAccident Commission, Mr.
Justice Stone, writing for a unanimous Court, explicitly employed an analysis in terms
of state interests to decide a question of the applicability of state workmen's compensation statutes under the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit clauses. With this event,
the methods of sociological jurisprudence were at last made accessible to the discipline
of conflict of laws. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 201 (1963).

62. Pierce v. Foley Bros., 283 Minn. 360, 168 N.W.2d 346 (1969). In an action to enforce
a compensation award made in Oklahoma, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an employment contract entered into in Oklahoma between a Montana employer and an Oklahoma
resident provided sufficient contacts for Oklahoma to have jurisdiction of an injury sustained
in Montana, where he had worked pursuant to the contract. Cf. Woodward v. J.J. Grier Co.,
270 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954). The court held that where the law of the state of
contracting provides that the parties can contract as to coverage, the Alaska Packers case is
inapplicable, because the California act stated that no contract shall exempt the employer from
liability. Hence, where a Missouri employment contract provided that the law of the place of
injury should apply, Missouri was without jurisdiction to award benefits for an injury in
Wyoming.
63. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
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relevant factors listed above was the same here as in Bradford: the
place of injury was California; everything else was in Massachusetts.

The trip to California was a brief and temporary one. Yet, this time
the Supreme Court approved. California's application of its act. It

even went so far as to say that "few matters could be deemed more
appropriately the concern of the state in which the injury occurs or
more completely within its power" than "the bodily safety and economic protection of employees injured within it."4 It also sounded a
practical note, once more of realistic relevance to the facts of everyday

compensation life, when it pointed out that refusal to apply the California law might require California physicians and hospitals to go to
another state to collect charges for medical care.
What little might have been left of Bradford after Pacific Employers was obliterated by Carroll v. Lanza6" in 1955, when the Supreme

Court held that the full faith and credit clause does not require the
state of the injury to apply its sister state's prohibitory provisions.
Here the place of contract and residence of employer and employee

were in Missouri. After an injury in Arkansas the employee returned
to Missouri for care. The work done in Arkansas was for the prime
64. Id. at 503.
65. 349 U.S. 408 (1955) (6-3 decision). This decision was followed in Collins v. American
Buslines, Inc., 350 U.S. 528 (1956), involving an attempt to press into service another constitutional issue, that of burdening interstate commerce. A bus driver, a resident of California, was
injured in Arizona on a regular run from Los Angeles to Phoenix. The state court, after
concluding that the bus company operated exclusively in interstate commerce, held that the
commerce clause of the Constitution precluded recovery under the Arizona act because the
employee was covered by the California statute, and to require his interstate employer to insure
in Arizona would place an undue burden on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reversed,
saying:
Whatever dollars-and-cents burden an eventual judgment for claimants in the position of petitioners may cast either upon a carrier or the State's fund, it is too insufficient,
compared with the interest of the State in affording remedies for injuries committed
within its boundaries, see Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 75 S.Ct. 804, 99 L. Ed. 1183,
to dislodge state power.
Accord, Agee v. Industrial Comm'n, 455 P.2d 288 (Ariz. App. 1969) [Claimants, residents
of Colorado, who were hired in Colorado, were injured while on a trucking run from Colorado
to California. The injuries were suffered in Arizona, the employer's business was primarily of
an interstate nature. Requirement that the employer secure compensation coverage pursuant to
Arizona law was held not to be an undue burden on interstate commerce so as to exempt the
employer from the necessity of obtaining such coverage.]; Lavoie's Case, 334 Mass. 403, 135
N.E.2d 750 (1956) (residence and employment contract made in Rhode Island; injury in Massachusetts; compensable in Massachusetts); Mandle v. R.O. Kelly, 229 Miss. 327, 90 So. 2d 645
(1956) (contract and residence of employer and employee in Georgia; injury while on temporary
trip to Mississippi; Mississippi act could apply).
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contractor. Missouri bars suits against such contractors; Arkansas
allows suit. In holding that suit could be maintained in Arkansas
against the prime contractor, the Court said:
[T]he Pacific Employers Insurance Co. case teaches that in these personal
injury cases the State where the injury occurs need not be a vassal to the home
State and allow only that remedy which the home State has marked as the
exclusive one. The State of the forum also has interests to serve and to protect. . . . Arkansas therefore has a legitimate interest in opening her courts
to suits of this nature, even though in this case Carroll's injury may have cast
66
no burden on her or on her institutions.

Before Carroll, the argument might have been attempted that
Pacific Employers was distinguishable from Bradford in that the former involved a deliberate expression of public policy of the forum
state in the form of enactment of a modern remedial statute, while
the latter involved only the common-law tort remedy traditionally
available in the state. The defendant in Carrolldid in fact rely on this
distinction, as amounting to a marked difference in expression of
economic and social policy by the forum state. The Court rejected this
contention:
That is not in our judgment a material difference. Whatever deprives the remedy of the home State of its exclusive character qualifies or contravenes the
policy of that State and denies it full faith and credit, if full faith and credit is
67
due.

The Court emphasized that a state has a legitimate interest in effectuating its public policy whether that policy is expressed in statutes
or only in the common law. With matters in this posture, there was
no way to avoid disavowing Bradford, which the Court did by stating
that in Pacific Employers the Court had "departed" from Bradford.
The existence of a legitimate interest in the injury and its consequences had also been decisively confirmed as the controlling constitutional test in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.6 s This time
the employee's residence, the employer's business headquarters, and
the original place of hiring were all in the District of Columbia, while
Virginia was the site both of the current work, which had been going
on for three years, and of the injury. The constitutional right of the
District to apply its own compensation law was upheld. It is signifi66. 349 U.S. at412.
67. Id.
68. 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
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cant that the Supreme Court's entire rationale for this holding consisted of the following line of argument:
A prime purpose of the Act is to provide residents of the District of Columbia
with a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial accidents and to
place on District of Columbia employers a limited and determinate liability. . . . [T]he District's legitimate interest in providing adequate workmen's

compensation measures for its residents does not turn on the fortuitous circumstance of the place of their work or injury. . . . Rather it depends upon some
substantial connection between the District and the particular employeeemployer relationship, a connection which is present in this case. . . . And as
so applied, the statute fully satisfies any constitutional questions of due process
69
or full faith and credit.

Although, then, there is not a separate Supreme Court case for
each of the six potential sources of interest, the general principle is
broad enough to cover all but the last,-contractual stipulation for a
particular statute. The place of injury has the authority of the Pacific
Employers and Carrollcases to support its claim. The rest figure in
the application of the general test to the Alaska Packers and Liberty
Mutual situations. The place where the employment relation is created by contract or actually carried on has an interest in regulating
the rights and welfare of employees and the corresponding obligations
and immunities of employers. The place where the employee or his
dependents reside also has an interest of specific relevance to compensation law; for if the employee is left uncompensated or undercompensated, it is his local community that will have to bear the
expense of direct assistance and relief. Finally, the place where the
industry is localized has a special interest, in that the burdens and
costs of compensation fall most directly upon employers and consumers in the area where the industry is centered.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Alaska Packers contained
some language which might have suggested that the interest of the
forum state was to be weighed against that of the foreign state in
determining the full faith and credit issue. He said, for example, that
one who challenges the right of the forum state to apply its own law
"assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of
the conflicting interests involved those ofthe foreign state are superior
to those of the forum." 70 Later he said of California: "Its interest is
69. Id. at 476 (citations omitted). See also the passage quoted from the Bradford case in
the text accompanying note 60 supra.
70. 294 U.S. at 547-48.
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sufficient to justify its legislation and is greater than that of Alaska,
of which the employee was never a resident and to which he may never
7
return." '
Subsequent cases have made it clear, however, that the test is not
whether the interest of the forum state is relatively greater, but only
whether it is legitimate and substantial in itself. In Pacific Employers
the court said of the process of determining when the forum state must
deny rights asserted under its own laws: "But there would seem to be
little room for the exercise of that function when the statute of the
forum is the expression of [public] policy .... -72 Carrollspoke only
in terms of existence of a legitimate interest in the forum state, not
of a superior interest. Indeed, the significance of the case on this point
is highlighted by the fact that the dissent argued unsuccessfully for a
"balancing" of the relative state interests.73 And, of course, the entire
development of the successive-award practice under MeCartin
confirms the irrelevance of "weighing," since if only the state with
the greater interest could constitutionally apply its law, it would be
logically impossible for two states to make an award for the same
injury.
The same language quoted from Alaska Packers might also have
left the impression that the relative interests of the state should be
weighed on a case-by-case basis, in the light of the particular facts
involved. Thus, in Alaska Packers mention was made of the fact that
the claimant would probably not go back to Alaska. In Pacific Employers, there was evidence that the claimant actually had hospital
and medical bills in California that were unpaid. But Carroll
discredited this approach completely, again over the objection of the
dissent on the specific point. Under the Carrollfacts, since the claimant had returned to Missouri for treatment, the conventional arguments about running up unpaid bills or becoming a public burden
were not applicable, if the matter was to be considered on an individual basis. But Mr. Justice Douglas said that the interests of the
forum state must be judged "not only in the light of the facts of this
case but by the kind of situation presented. For we write not only for
this case and this day alone, but for this type of case. . . .Arkansas
therefore has a legitimate interest in opening her courts to suits of this
71. Id. at 549-50.
72. 306 U.S. at 502-03.
73. 349 U.S. at 417-19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

1062

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1971:1037

nature, even though in this case Carroll's injury may have cast no
74
burden on her or her institutions.
The irrelevance of weighing interests in compensation cases must
be particularly observed to avoid confusion with the controversy in
conflicts law generally over the "dominant interest" or "most significant relationship" theories of choice of law. The conflicts problem in
compensation law, as stressed at the outset, is normally not a choiceof-law question at all, since the forum can apply only one statute, that
of its own state, and there is thus no occasion or opportunity to
engage in a choice of law. The only "choice" the forum has is to grant
relief under its own statute or to deny relief altogether. With that pair
of alternatives, it is easy to see why some substantial interest should
suffice, without worrying about its relative weight when compared
with the interests of foreign states.
When it was stressed above that the only ground relied on in
Liberty Mutual was the legitimate-interest argument, this was done
for the specific purpose of indicating that several other distinctions
and arguments, which figured quite prominently in earlier opinions,
seem to have lost their relevance. There was quite a lot of importance
in Bradford, Alaska Packers, and Pacific Employers attributed to the
question whether the foreign statute purported to be exclusive, since
the first inroads into the Bradford doctrine had been made by a
distinction turning on this question in Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler &
Tank Co. 75 which had held that no question of full faith and credit
arises at all if the statute of the foreign state is not intended to be
exclusive of remedies in other states, since, if the foreign state does
not claim exclusive jurisdiction, it naturally is not offended if another
state takes jurisdiction. But when, as was assumed in most of the
other cases, the foreign state's statute was exclusive, this was offset
by saying that the exclusiveness could be defied by the local state if
the foreign statute was "obnoxious" to local policy. 76 Obnoxiousness
was readily found, 77 however, and presumably could be said to exist
74. Id. at 413.
75. 289 U.S. 439 (1933).
76. For an opinion dealing in detail with this issue, see MeKane v. New Amsterdam Cas.
Co., 199 So. 175 (La. App. 1940).
77. The possibility that California doctors might have difficulty collecting their bills in
Massachusetts was the "obnoxiousness" relied on in the Pacific Employers case. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 10 Cal. 2d 567, 75 P.2d 1058, 1063 (1938).
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on the mere ground that the foreign statute's benefits were inferior 78
or less conveniently available to the claimant. Oddly enough, the only
case in which there was a deepseated policy difference between the two
statutes was the one case in which "obnoxiousness" was found to be
absent-Bradford.
Beginning with Liberty Mutual, the word "obnoxiousness" disappears from the lexicon of compensation conflicts, so far as the Supreme Court is concerned, and in Carroll the subject is not even
considered.
Since McCartin has recognized that the ordinary exclusivecoverage clause does not assume to be exclusive of out-of-state compensation remedies, this entire aspect of the subject may now apparently be written off as an approach to the problem which proved to
be much too artificial and technical to meet the needs of compensation administration-a conclusion confirmed by the Supreme Court's
complete ignoring of the issue in the Liberty Mutual and Carroll
opinions.
Impracticabilityof Single-JurisdictionRule
To summarize, the entire complicated story unfolded in this article. It opens with a peaceful picture of state courts unvexed by misgivings about full faith and credit or successive awards; next shows the
abrupt incursion of the Supreme Court, which then presided over a
period characterized by intricate legal controversy; and concludes
with the virtual withdrawal of the Supreme Court from the area,
leaving matters almost exactly as they would have remained had the
79
Court not intervened.
This is not to say that this whole field of law was the by-product
of needless meddlesomeness; on the contrary, it was probably the
result of a laudable desire to impose some kind of uniformity on the
undisciplined jungle of state rules that had emerged from the different
statutes and decisions. The Supreme Court was the only power that
could do the job, if the job could be done at all; and it evidently
thought that it might gradually, by a series of constitutional holdings,
78. Obnoxiousness on the ground of smaller benefits was used as a supporting ground in
Hudson v. Kingston Contracting Co., 58 N.J. Super. 455, 156 A.2d 491 (Mercer County Ct.

1959).
79. There is a striking parallelism between this cycle and that of the rise and fall of the
Supreme Court's attempt to demarcate the line between the Longshoremen's Act and state
compensation acts by Constitution-based doctrines. See LARSON §§ 89.20 to 89.60.
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be able to construct a set of overriding principles under which one
could eventually say in any given combination of facts, "This case
falls within the statute of State A, and no other." But it was not to
be. The diversity between states in their statutory and decisional laws
had gone too far, and working uniformity could never have been
achieved without a simultaneous amendment of all state statutes so
that each was the perfect complement of the other. The achievement
of such statutory coordination is, of course, entirely improbable; but
even if it were possible, there is serious doubt whether the states would
find it desirable. The low-benefit states might fear that the operation
of a uniform rule would put unpredictable high-benefit burdens on its
employers, while the high-benefit states might fear that in certain
combinations of facts employees in whom they have an interest would
get an unacceptably low level of compensation.
The only uniformity to be looked for, then, is the uniform right
of all states having a'legitimate interest in the injury to apply their
own diverse rules and standards-separately, simultaneously or successively.

